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LOCKING DOWN OUR BORDERS: HOW 
ANTI-IMMIGRATION SENTIMENT LED TO 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION AND 
THE EROSION OF FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT  
Jamie Nielsen* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. History of the Real ID Act 
Feeding off of the wave of anti-immigration sentiment 
following the events of September 11th 2001, the Real ID Act 
was designed to quell illegal immigration by implementing a 
national ID card system and bolstering border security. The Act 
was first introduced by Wisconsin U.S. Representative James 
Sensenbrenner as part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004.1 Due to heavy opposition in the Senate, 
the Real ID provisions were dropped prior to passage.2 
However, it was reintroduced in 2005 and attached to legislation 
that House leaders were certain would pass in the Senate.3 Thus, 
                                                          
* B.S., Bryant University, 2001; J.D., Brooklyn Law School, expected 
2010. The author wishes to thank her parents for providing endless support 
and encouragement, as well as the members of the Journal of Law and Policy 
for all of their hard work.  
1 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. 
No. 108–458, § 7212, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004). 
2 Media Matters, O’Reilly Misleadingly Claimed Real ID Act Passed 
Senate 100-0, MEDIA MATTERS, May 13, 2005, http://mediamatters.org/ 
items/200505130002. 
3 “[A]pparently recognizing that the stand-alone bill lacked support in the 
Senate, the House leadership attached the legislation to the House version of 
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the bill was passed as a rider to the Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and 
Tsunami Relief, 2005.4 As noted by one legal scholar, “[i]t 
would have been a serious political liability for a congressperson 
to vote against funding for the war on terror and tsunami relief. 
So it is unsurprising that there was no debate on, no hearings 
on, and no public vetting of the act.”5  
The Real ID Act is most notorious for requiring a national 
identification card system, which in turn requires states to fund 
and implement a system of federally standardized drivers 
licenses.6 The cards will contain the personal information of the 
holder and will be equipped with machine-readable technology, 
allowing them to be scanned.7 The cards will not only be 
necessary for activities such as flying or visiting federal 
buildings, but also for “‘everyday transactions,’ such as 
receiving government benefits, voting, or applying for a job. 
The private sector will also begin mandating a Real ID card for 
everyday purposes.”8 In order to obtain the new cards, people 
will be required to present documentation to their state 
Department of Motor Vehicles proving their “name, date of 
birth, Social Security number, their principal residence . . . and 
that they are lawfully in the U.S.”9 In addition to excluding 
many individuals living within the states from receiving an ID 
card,10 the law will be outrageously costly.11 
                                                          
the emergency funding bill.” Id. 
4 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global 
War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109–13, 119 Stat. 231 
(2005). 
5 Anita Ramasastry, Why the ‘Real ID’ Act, Which Requires National 
Identity Cards, is a Real Mess, FINDLAW, Aug. 10, 2005, http://writ.news. 
findlaw.com/ramasastry/20050810.html. 
6 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act §§ 201–207. 
7 Id. at § 202(b). 
8 New York Civil Liberties Union, Why Oppose the Real ID Act?, 
http://dev.nyclu.org/realid/why_oppose (last visited Sept. 30, 2009). 
9 Ramasastry, supra note 5; see also Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act § 202(c)(1)–(2). 
10 The documentation requirements will prevent not only illegal 
immigrants already residing in the United States from receiving ID cards, but 
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While opponents have voiced strong criticism regarding the 
cost, invasion of privacy, identity theft, and immigrant 
discrimination that accompany the identification cards,12 little has 
been said about the other provisions of the Act—in particular 
Section 102(c)13, designed to amend Section 102(c) of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996.14 Section 102 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 aimed to deter illegal 
crossings at United States borders with two protective fences 
“along the 14 miles of the international land border of the 
United States, starting at the Pacific Ocean and extending 
eastward.”15 This project was expanded following September 
11th, when Congress began to play off of America’s terrorism 
                                                          
also many legal immigrants. See NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., QUESTIONS 
AND ANSWERS ABOUT DRIVER’S LICENSES NOW THAT FINAL REAL ID 
REGULATIONS HAVE BEEN ISSUED (2008), available at http://www.nilc.org/ 
immspbs/DLs/QA_re_DLs_post-regs_2008-02-27.pdf. Further, legal citizens 
may have difficulty obtaining the required documents due to factors such as 
age or poverty. See Joan Fridland, Nat’l Immigration Law Ctr., Presentation 
at the Immigration Advocates Network Webinar: Immigrants, Driver’s 
Licenses, and the Real ID Act: Requirements, Implementation, and Options 
Available to States (Dec. 15, 2006), available at http://www.democracyin 
action.org/dia/organizationsORG/NILC/images/REAL ID webinar NILC.ppt.   
11 The DHS [Department of Homeland Security] originally estimated 
that the law would cost $23.1 billion. The final regulations slash this 
estimate to $9.9 billion over 11 years by relying on the ridiculous 
premise that only 75 percent of licensed drivers will seek to obtain a 
Real ID. As of February 2008, Congress had set aside only $80 
million to help pay for implementing Real ID across the entire 
country.  
N.Y. Civil Liberties Union, supra note 8. 
12 See, e.g., id.; Real Nightmare, Opposition Voices, http://www.real 
nightmare.org/opposition/9/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2009). 
13 Section 102 of the Real ID Act is titled “Waiver of Legal 
Requirements Necessary for Improvement of Barriers at Borders.” 
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act § 102. 
14 8 U.S.C.A. § 1103 note (c) (West 2009) (Improvement of Barriers at 
Border). 
15 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104–208, 
§ 102(b)(1), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). 
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fears in order to strengthen immigration controls. Amendments 
such as those made in the Secure Fence Act of 200616 provided 
for “reinforced fencing along not less than 700 miles of the 
southwest border.”17  
Similarly, while the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act originally provided for waiver of 
provisions of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 and the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 “to the extent the 
Attorney General determines necessary to ensure expeditious 
construction of the barriers and roads,”18 Section 102(c)(1) of 
the Real ID Act amended this to read: 
IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall have the 
authority to waive all legal requirements such Secretary, 
in such Secretary’s sole discretion, determines necessary 
to ensure expeditious construction of the barriers and 
roads under this section.  Any such decision by the 
Secretary shall be effective upon being published in the 
Federal Register.19   
The Department of Homeland Security was created as an 
executive agency by President Bush following September 11th 
and assumed several functions previously held by other 
governmental agencies.20 In particular, the authority previously 
granted to the Attorney General in Section 102 of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
was assigned to the Secretary of Homeland Security.21 Under the 
new provisions of Section 102 of the Real ID Act, the Secretary 
                                                          
16 Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–367, § 3, 120 Stat. 2638 
(2006). 
17 8 U.S.C.A. § 1103 note (b)(1)(A) (West 2009) (Improvement of 
Barriers at Border). 
18 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act § 102(c). 
19 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global 
War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109–13, § 102(c)(1), 119 
Stat. 231 (2005). 
20 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, § 1511, 
1517, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 
21 Id.  
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now has sole discretion to waive any and all laws he deems 
necessary for expeditious construction of the border fence, 670 
miles of which had a completion deadline of December 31, 
2008.22 Additionally, the Real ID Act significantly narrows 
judicial review of the Secretary’s discretionary decisions: 
IN GENERAL.—The district courts of the United States 
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear all causes or 
claims arising from any action undertaken, or any 
decision made, by the Secretary of Homeland Security 
pursuant to paragraph (1). A cause of action or claim 
may only be brought alleging a violation of the 
Constitution of the United States.  The court shall not 
have jurisdiction to hear any claim not specified in this 
subparagraph . . . . Any cause or claim brought pursuant 
to subparagraph (A) shall be filed not less than 60 days 
after the date of the action or decision made by the 
Secretary of Homeland Security. A claim shall be barred 
unless it is filed within the time specified . . . . An 
interlocutory or final judgment, decree, or order of the 
district court may be reviewed only upon petition for a 
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United 
States.23  
Thus, as this Note will argue, Section 102(c) of the Real ID 
Act is unconstitutional, violating the separation of powers 
doctrine by granting entirely too much power to one individual 
while leaving little room for judicial review. Additionally, when 
given the opportunity to review the constitutionality of the Act 
                                                          
22 8 U.S.C.A. § 1103 note (b)(1)(B) (West 2009) (Improvement of 
Barriers at Border). The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act specified “370 miles, or other mileage determined by the 
Secretary” shall be completed by December 31, 2008. Id. The Department of 
Homeland Security committed to having 670 miles of fencing completed by 
December 31, 2008 (370 miles of pedestrian fencing and 300 miles of vehicle 
fencing). OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-
09-56, PROGRESS IN ADDRESSING SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE OPERATIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRUCTING THE SOUTHWEST BORDER FENCE 15 
(2009).  
23 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act § 102(c)(2). 
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in Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff,24 the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari and failed to perform its job as a check on legislative 
power. The Note will begin with an overview of Chertoff and 
the district court’s rationale in upholding the Real ID Act. Part 
II will examine the historical importance of the separation of 
powers doctrine, including application of the doctrine in 
significant case law. Part III will demonstrate the 
unconstitutionality of the Real ID Act by comparing the Real ID 
Act to other separation of powers cases. Part IV examines the 
devastating results of such legislation and the Supreme Court’s 
inaction.  Finally, Part V proposes a solution to redress the 
consequences of the Court’s inaction. 
B. Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff 
In September of 2007, at the direction of the Department of 
Homeland Security, the Army Corps of Engineers began 
construction of the border fence, along with a road and drainage 
structures, in an area known as the San Pedro Riparian National 
Conservation Area (SPRNCA) in Arizona.25 The SPRNCA 
consists of approximately 57,000 acres of public land in Cochise 
County, Arizona.26 The San Pedro River, “one of the last free-
flowing rivers in the United States”27 runs though the SPRNCA 
and the area has been described as “one of the most biologically 
diverse areas of the United States.”28 Congress officially 
                                                          
24 Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 
2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2962 (2008). 
25 Id. at 121. 
26 United States Department of the Interior, San Pedro RNCA, http://blm 
.gov/az/st/en/prog/blm_special_areas/ncarea/sprnca.html (last visited Sept. 
30, 2009) [hereinafter San Pedro RNCA]. 
27 Press Release, Defenders of Wildlife & Sierra Club, Conservation 
Groups Ask Federal Government to Consider Border Fence’s Overall Impact 
to Wildlife, Public Lands in Arizona (Oct. 1, 2007), available at http://www. 
defenders.org/newsroom/press_releases_folder/2007/10_01_2007_groups_app
eal_to_feds_on_border_fence.php?ht=. 
28 Defenders of Wildlife, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 121 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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designated it as a conservation area on November 18, 1988.29 
Recognizing the ecological significance of the SPRNCA and 
the potential damage of fencing,30 Defenders of Wildlife filed a 
motion for a temporary restraining order in district court. The 
motion alleged that the Bureau of Land Management (the agency 
charged with managing the SPRNCA) conducted an inadequate 
Environmental Assessment prior to granting a perpetual right of 
way to the Department of Homeland Security for fence 
construction31 and that the bureau also erred in determining that 
an Environmental Impact Statement was not required by the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.32 Defenders of 
Wildlife further argued that the right-of-way grant violated the 
Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act of 1988, which required the 
Bureau of Land Management to “manage the SPRNCA ‘in a 
manner that conserves, protects, and enhances the riparian area 
and the aquatic, wildlife, archeological, paleontological, 
scientific, cultural, educational, and recreational resources of the 
                                                          
29 San Pedro RNCA, supra note 26.  
The primary purpose for the special designation is to protect and 
enhance the desert riparian ecosystem, a rare remnant of what was 
once an extensive network of similar riparian systems throughout the 
American Southwest. One of the most important riparian areas in the 
United States, the San Pedro River runs through the Chihuahuan 
Desert and the Sonoran Desert in Southeastern Arizona. The river’s 
stretch is home to 84 species of mammals, 14 species of fish, 41 
species of reptiles and amphibians, and 100 species of breeding 
birds. It also provides invaluable habitat for 250 species of migrant 
and wintering birds and contains archaeological sites representing the 
remains of human occupation from 13,000 years ago. 
Id. 
30 Defenders of Wildlife, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 121 n.1 (“The challenged 
fence construction requires excavation on up to 225 of the SPRNCA’s 58,000 
acres, and the proposed fence segments will cover approximately 9,938 feet 
at the border when completed.”).   
31 Id. at 121. The Bureau of Land Management “concluded that the 
proposed fencing would have no significant impact on the environment when 
paired with certain mitigation measures and that an Environmental Impact 
Statement (‘IS’) was not therefore required by the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969 (‘NEPA’).” Id. (citations omitted). 
32 Id. 
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conservation area’ and to ‘only allow such uses of the 
conservation area’ that further the purposes for which it was 
established.”33 The court granted the temporary restraining 
order, noting that “plaintiffs had demonstrated a substantial 
likelihood of success on the merits with respect to their NEPA 
claims and that the balance of equities favored plaintiffs,”34 and 
construction of the border fence was halted.35   
However, approximately two weeks later, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, used his discretionary 
powers to waive twenty statutes in their entirety (most of them 
environmental) in order to continue the fence construction.36 
                                                          
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 On October 26, 2007, the Secretary’s decision to waive the following 
statutes was announced in the Federal Register: The National Environmental 
Policy Act (Pub. L. 91–190, 83 Stat. 852 (Jan. 1, 1970) (42 U.S.C. 4321 et 
seq.)), the Endangered Species Act (Pub. L. 93–205, 87 Stat. 884 (Dec. 28, 
1973) (16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.)), the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
(commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act) (Act of June 30, 1948, c. 
758, 62 Stat. 1155 (33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.)), the National Historic 
Preservation Act (Pub. L. 89–665, 80 Stat. 915 (Oct. 15, 1966) (16 U.S.C. 
470 et seq.)), the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (16 U.S.C. 703 et seq.), the 
Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.), the Archeological Resources 
Protection Act (Pub. L. 96–95, 16 U.S.C. 470aa et seq.), the Safe Drinking 
Water Act (42 U.S.C. 300f et seq.), the Noise Control Act (42 U.S.C. 4901 
et seq.), the Solid Waste Disposal Act, as amended by the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.), the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (42 U.S.C. 9601 
et seq.), the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (Pub. L. 94–579, 43 
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (Pub. L. 73–
121, 48 Stat. 401, 16 U.S.C. 661 et seq.), the Archaeological and Historic 
Preservation Act (Pub. L. 86–523, 16 U.S.C. 469 et seq.), the Antiquities 
Act (16 U.S.C. 431 et seq.), the Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiquities 
Act (16 U.S.C. 461 et seq.), the Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act of 1988 
(Pub. L. 100–696, 16 U.S.C. 460xx et seq.), the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act 
(Pub. L. 90–542, 16 U.S.C. 1281 et seq.), the Farmland Protection Policy 
Act (7 U.S.C. 4201 et seq.) and the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 
551 et seq.). Determination Pursuant to Section 102 of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 as Amended 
by Section 102 of the REAL ID Act of 2005 and as Amended by the Secure 
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Additionally, Chertoff stated that he reserved the “authority to 
make further waivers from time to time.”37  Using the highly 
subjective standards set forth in the Act, Chertoff stated that the 
SPRNCA “is an area of high illegal entry” in which “there is 
presently a need to erect fixed and mobile barriers . . . and 
roads.”38 Therefore, he deemed it “necessary” to exercise his 
waiver authority and, as a result, the temporary restraining order 
was vacated.39  
In response, Defenders of Wildlife filed an amended 
complaint in district court, alleging “that the waiver provision of 
the REAL ID Act violates separation of powers principles 
embodied in Articles I and II of the Constitution because it 
‘impermissibly delegates legislative powers to the DHS 
Secretary, a politically-appointed Executive Branch official.”40 
Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the case fell precisely 
within the Court’s holding in Clinton v. City of New York,41 
where provisions of the Line Item Veto Act were found 
unconstitutional because Presidential repeal of laws is not 
constitutionally permissible.42 The defendants moved to dismiss 
the complaint43 on grounds that the Real ID Act’s waiver 
provisions constituted a permissible delegation of legislative 
power to the Executive Branch under the Court’s 
“nondelegation” jurisprudence because “it provides the Secretary 
with an ‘intelligible principle’ that ‘clearly delineate[s] the 
general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the 
boundaries of th[e] delegated authority.’”44 Additionally, the 
defendants set forth the argument that “‘Congress may delegate 
in even broader terms’ than otherwise permissible in matters of 
                                                          
Fence Act of 206, 72 Fed. Reg. 60,870 (Oct. 26, 2007). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Defenders of Wildlife, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 123. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 124 (citing Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)). 
42 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998).  
43 Defendants moved to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) and 
12(b)(6). Defenders of Wildlife, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 123. 
44 Id. 
NIELSEN REVISED.DOC 4/28/2010  11:39 AM 
468 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
immigration policy, foreign affairs, and national security, 
because ‘the Executive Branch already maintains significant 
independent control’ over these areas.”45 
In issuing its opinion, the district court quickly dismissed the 
plaintiff’s comparison to Clinton.46  The court held that the 
repeal of laws in Clinton was distinguishable from the waiver of 
laws at issue here.47 Whereas in Clinton repeal meant the 
affected laws no longer had “any ‘legal force or effect’ under 
any circumstance,”48 the waived laws at issue “retain[] the same 
legal force and effect [they] had when [] passed by both houses 
of Congress and presented to the President.”49 The court further 
stated: 
The fact that the laws no longer apply to the extent they 
otherwise would have with respect to the construction of 
border barriers and roads within the SPRNCA does not, 
as plaintiffs argue, transform the waiver into an 
unconstitutional ‘partial repeal’ of those laws. By that 
logic, any waiver, no matter how limited in scope, would 
violate Article I because it would allow the Executive 
Branch to unilaterally ‘repeal’ or nullify the law with 
respect to the limited purpose delineated by the waiver 
legislation.50 
With regard to the plaintiffs’ separation of powers argument, 
the court cited the rationale from Smith v. Fed. Reserve Bank of 
N.Y. that “‘the Supreme Court has widely permitted the 
Congress to delegate its legislative authority to other branches,’ 
so long as the delegation is accompanied by sufficient 
guidance.”51 Further, that delegation is permitted where 
“Congress ‘lay[s] down . . . an intelligible principle to which 
                                                          
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 124. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 126 (citing Smith v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 280 F. Supp. 
2d 314, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). 
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the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated 
authority] is directed to conform . . . .’”52 The Chertoff court 
held that the provisions requiring that fencing be erected 
specifically in areas “of high illegal entry,”53 “to deter illegal 
crossings,”54 and that the Secretary only exercise his waiver 
authority as he “determines necessary to ensure expeditious 
construction of the barriers and roads”55 constituted “clearly 
delineated” boundaries under which the Secretary was 
authorized to act.56 
The Chertoff court also found that the broad scope of the 
Secretary’s power to waive “all legal requirements”57 that he 
deems necessary in his “sole discretion”58 was not 
unconstitutional.59  Despite finding a lack of historical support 
for such sweeping waiver authority,60 the court found that it was 
constitutional because “under the nondelegation doctrine, the 
relevant inquiry is whether the Legislative Branch has laid down 
an intelligible principle to guide the Executive Branch, not the 
scope of the waiver power.”61 The court further agreed with the 
defendants62 that legislative delegations may be broader when the 
subject matter is one over which the Executive Branch already 
                                                          
52 Id. at 127 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 
(1989)). 
53 8 U.S.C.A. § 1103 note (a) (West 2009) (Improvement of Barriers at 
Border). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. note (c)(1). 
56 Defenders of Wildlife, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 127. 
57 8 U.S.C.A. § 1103 note (c)(1) (West 2009) (Improvement of Barriers 
at Border). 
58 Id. 
59 Defenders of Wildlife, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 129. 
60 The Court cited a Congressional Research Service Memorandum 
which stated “the REAL ID Act’s waiver provision appears to be 
unprecedented in that it ‘contains notwithstanding language,’ provides a 
secretary of an executive agency the authority to waive all laws such 
secretary determines necessary, and directs the secretary to waive such 
laws.” Id. at 128. 
61 Id. at 129. 
62 See supra text accompanying note 45. 
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possesses considerable constitutional power.63 Therefore, because 
the border fence falls under the Executive controlled areas of 
foreign affairs and immigration control,64 the broad delegation of 
authority to the Secretary of Homeland Security by the 
legislature was constitutionally permissible.65  
Following the district court’s dismissal with prejudice, 
Defenders of Wildlife exercised the only available option under 
the Act and petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme 
Court.66 Fourteen members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, numerous distinguished law professors, and 
various organizations (ranging from environmental groups to the 
United Church of Christ) filed Amicus briefs in support of the 
petitioners.67 However, in June of 2008, the Supreme Court 
denied certiorari.68 In a public statement, House Representative 
Lamar Smith criticized the Supreme Court’s decision as allowing 
border fences to be built “without legal restrictions or 
interference from environmentalists.”69 
Rule 10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United 
States sets forth basic guidelines for the Court to grant a petition 
                                                          
63 “When the area to which the legislation pertains is one where the 
Executive Branch already has significant independent constitutional authority, 
delegations may be broader than in other contexts.” Defenders of Wildlife, 
527 F. Supp. 2d at 129 (citing Sierra Club v. Ashcroft, Civ. No. 04–272, 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44244, at *17 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2005)). 
64 Id. at 129. 
65 Id. 
66 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 128 
S. Ct. 2962 (2008) (No. 07-1180). 
67 Brief for Fourteen Members of the U.S. House of Representatives as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Defenders of Wildlife, 128 S. Ct. 
2962 (No. 07–1180); Brief of William D. Araiza et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners, Defenders of Wildlife, 128 S. Ct. 2962 (No. 07–
1180); Brief of the National Advocacy Center of the Sisters of the Good 
Shepherd et al. as Amici Curiae Support of Petitioners, Defenders of Wildlife, 
128 S. Ct. 2962 (No. 07–1180). 
68 Defenders of Wildlife, 128 S. Ct. 2962. 
69 Gary Martin, Court’s Fence Ruling Strengthens Government Power, 
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 28, 2008, at 9B. 
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for certiorari.70 Of those standards, one is particularly 
pertinent—where “a state court or a United States court of 
appeals has decided an important question of federal law that has 
not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has decided an 
important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant 
decisions of this Court” the court should grant certiorari.71 The 
Court’s denial of certiorari without explanation has left 
commentators at a loss, with some speculating that “the decision 
served as a death knell for future legal challenges to the 
fence,”72 and others holding out “hope that a second, separate 
legal challenge may yet succeed.”73 Nevertheless, it is clear that 
the Court should have granted certiorari because the district 
court’s decision to uphold Section 102(c) of the Act “conflicts 
with relevant decisions of”74 the Supreme Court by violating the 
fundamental doctrine of separation of powers. 
II. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CHECKS AND BALANCES 
A. Historical Significance of Separation of Powers 
The Constitution clearly divides the power of the federal 
government into three distinct branches, with Article I granting 
legislative power to Congress,75 Article II giving executive 
power to the President,76 and Article III vesting judicial power in 
the Supreme Court.77 In The Federalist No. 47, James Madison 
                                                          
70 SUP. CT. R. 10. 
71 Id. at 10(c).   
72 Martin, supra note 69. 
73 Border Fence Legal Waivers Still Under Threat in Second Lawsuit, 
DEF. ENV’T ALERT, Jul. 8, 2008. 
74 SUP. CT. R. 10(c). 
75 “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of 
the United States which shall consist of a Senate and a House of 
Representatives.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
76 “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States of America. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.  
77 “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to 
time ordain and establish.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.    
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wrote that “the accumulation of all powers, legislative, 
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a 
few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or 
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of 
tyranny.”78 Thus, the founding fathers recognized that in order 
to maintain this democratic form of government, a reliable 
method of reigning in branch power was essential.79 
Thus, the constitutional system of checks and balances was 
created, whereby “the President . . . may veto legislation; the 
Senate may confirm or deny the President’s appointment of his 
or her principal executive officers as well as federal judges; and 
Congress, by exercising its impeachment power, may remove 
judges and executive officers, including the President.”80 In 
addition to these explicit grants of authority, the power of 
judicial review stands as one of the most important 
constitutionally implied checks.81 Chief Justice Marshall 
categorically reinforced this principal in Marbury v. Madison,82 
holding that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.”83  
                                                          
78 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 313 (James Madison) (Sherman F. Mittell, 
ed., 1938). 
79 But the great security against a gradual concentration of the 
several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those 
who administer each department the necessary constitutional means 
and personal motives to resist encroachment of the others . . . . 
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition . . . . If men were 
angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern 
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be 
necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by 
men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable 
the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige 
it to control itself. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 337 (James Madison) (Sherman F. Mittell, ed., 
1938). 
80 CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 333 (2d ed. 
2005). 
81 Id. 
82 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
83 Id. at 177. 
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The separation of powers doctrine, and its accompanying 
system of checks and balances, is a fundamental characteristic of 
the American government.  As stated by Professor Thomas 
Sargentich, the doctrine continues to “serve the highly valued 
ends of avoiding undue concentration of governmental power, 
expanding representation and access to power, as well as 
promoting deliberation and counteracting factional influence on 
the government.”84 In Sargentich’s analysis of the separation of 
powers, the “normally emphasized”85 function of “prevention of 
concentrated power”86 is only part of the greater purpose served; 
the doctrine also brings together different actors in an effort to 
develop public policy. Legislation must filter through three 
distinct arenas before impacting society.87 Thus, public policy 
evolves from a broad base, more representative of the needs and 
values of American citizens.88  
The separation of powers doctrine “also multiplies the points 
of access for citizens who wish to get involved . . . [and] 
expands access to power in a society with great diversity and 
social division.”89 Complementing this principle of 
comprehensive representation is Sargentich’s point that the 
doctrine encourages discourse on varying societal attitudes.90 By 
forcing the branches to deliberate, differing viewpoints are 
expressed and compromises are inevitably made, thus 
                                                          
84 Thomas O. Sargentich, The Contemporary Assault on Checks and 
Balances, 7 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 231, 240 (1998). 
85 Id. at 236. 
86 Id. at 237. 
87 The second value served by the separation of powers and checks 
and balances is to bring together three main governmental actors in 
the development of public policy: the House of Representatives, 
elected from local districts; the Senate, elected from the states; and 
the President, elected in a national electoral contest. 
Id. at 239. 
88 See id. 
89 Id. 
90 “[T]he separation of powers and checks and balances tend to promote 
deliberation about public values and public purposes.” Id. 
NIELSEN REVISED.DOC 4/28/2010  11:39 AM 
474 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
minimizing the possible influence of special interest groups.91 It 
would be impossible and, perhaps, counterproductive to draw a 
clean line between each branch of government. The separation 
of powers doctrine “did not mean that these departments ought 
to have no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts of each 
other.”92 Therefore, the Supreme Court has consistently 
solidified the importance of the separation of powers doctrine 
and the necessity of judicial review, while recognizing the need 
for some interaction among the branches. 
B. Application of the Doctrine in Case Law 
In J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States93 the Court set 
forth the enduring rule governing when Congress may tip the 
delicate balance between the three separate powers and delegate 
its authority.94 While reaffirming that “Congress may not 
delegate its purely legislative power to a commission,”95 the 
Court held that legislative delegation is permissible when 
Congress has set forth an “intelligible principle”96 to which the 
authorized party must adhere.97 Years later, in Mistretta v. 
United States,98 the Court reaffirmed Congress’s constitutional 
power to delegate its authority in certain situations. Recognizing 
that “in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever 
changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot 
do its job absent an ability to delegate power under general 
                                                          
91 See id. at 239–40. “The key idea is that the requirement of having 
each of the named constitutional actors agree on a new statutory standard 
makes it harder for a [special interest group] to capture the government.” Id. 
at 240. 
92 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 78, at 314 
(emphasis in original). 
93 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928) 
(upholding congressional delegation of power to the President to increase or 
decrease duties according to the Tariff Act of 1922). 
94 Id. at 409. 
95 Id. at 408. 
96 Id. at 409. 
97 Id. 
98 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
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directives,”99 the Court permitted Congress to delegate  drafting 
of the federal sentencing guidelines to the United States 
Sentencing Commission,100 an independent agency under the 
judicial branch of the government.101 Reaffirming the 
“intelligible principal”102 doctrine, the Mistretta Court held that 
“Congress’ delegation of authority to the Sentencing 
Commission [was] sufficiently specific and detailed to meet 
constitutional requirements.”103 While upholding congressional 
delegations that are sufficiently narrow and precise enough not 
to violate the separation of powers, the Supreme Court has 
diligently protected the doctrine and struck down legislation that 
strays beyond these specifications, or grants too much power to 
one branch.104  
In recent years, the Court has exercised its power of judicial 
review in several cases involving legislation bearing a marked 
resemblance to Section 102(c) of the Act.105 For example, in INS 
v. Chadha,106 the Court declared a legislative provision 
unconstitutional for violating the separation of powers.107 At 
issue in Chadha was Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act,108 which allowed either House of Congress to 
veto, or invalidate, a decision by the Executive Branch to 
                                                          
99 Id. at 372.  
100 Id. at 374 (upholding Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1987) (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. § 3551 et 
seq. (1988) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–98 (1988))). 
101 An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, 
http://www.ussc.gov/general/USSC_Overview_200906.pdf (last visited 
November 14, 2009). 
102 J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409. 
103 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 374. 
104 See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).  
105 See, e.g., Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (holding a congressional veto 
provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act unconstitutional). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 959. 
108 Immigration and Nationality Act § 244(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1254(c)(2) 
(repealed by the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, § 308(b)(7), 110 Stat. 3009-615 (1996)). 
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suspend deportation of an alien residing in the United States.109 
The Court began by noting that “[the] principle of separation of 
powers was not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of 
the Framers: it was woven into the document that they drafted in 
Philadelphia in the summer of 1787.”110 In analyzing the 
provision, the Court held that the House action authorized under 
Section 244(c)(2) was essentially legislative action, requiring 
conformance with constitutionally established procedures.111 
Therefore, the Court held the “congressional veto provision in 
§ 244 (c)(2) . . . unconstitutional.”112 The Court felt that the 
provision granted too much power to one House of Congress113 
and again emphasized the importance of maintaining the specific 
constitutional powers of each branch: 
The bicameral requirement, the Presentment Clauses, the 
President’s veto, and Congress’ power to override a veto 
were intended to erect enduring checks on each Branch 
and to protect the people from the improvident exercise 
of power by mandating certain prescribed steps. To 
preserve those checks, and maintain the separation of 
                                                          
109 Id. The Immigration and Nationality Act contained a valid 
congressional delegation of Executive Power to the Attorney General. Id. 
§ 244(a)(1). The delegation set forth an intelligible principle under which the 
Attorney General was authorized to suspend the deportation of an alien 
provided that said alien met explicit requirements of the Act, specifically, a 
continuous physical presence in the United States during the immediately 
preceding seven years, good moral character, and extreme hardship to the 
alien or a family member (a United States citizen or lawful permanent 
resident) upon deportation. Id.  
110 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 
(1976)). 
111 The single House action authorized under Section 244(c)(2) did not 
fall under any of the four constitutional exceptions allowing one House of 
Congress to act alone. Id. at 955. 
112 Id. at 959. 
113 See id. In his concurrence, Justice Powell argued that such cases, 
involving legislative veto provisions, should be decided on a narrower basis, 
but nonetheless agreed with the outcome. Justice Powell stated, “when 
Congress finds that a particular person does not satisfy the statutory criteria 
for permanent residence in this country it has assumed a judicial function in 
violation of the separation of powers.” Id. at 960 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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powers, the carefully defined limits on the power of each 
Branch must not be eroded.114  
Further evidence of the Court’s customary protection of the 
doctrine can be found in the more recent case Clinton v. City of 
New York.115 Despite the district court’s contrary holding in 
Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff,116 the legislation struck down 
in Clinton is strikingly similar to Section 102(c) of the Act.117 In 
the well-known Clinton case, the Court held as unconstitutional 
the Line Item Veto Act of 1996118 which gave the President the 
power to cancel, or veto, any provision of a bill signed into law 
that fell under one of three specified categories.119 The Court, 
reaffirming Chadha, held that “[r]epeal of statutes, no less than 
enactment, must conform with Art. I,”120 and noted that “[t]here 
is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President 
to enact, amend, or repeal statutes.”121 Presidential veto power is 
authorized only before a bill becomes law and, even then, it 
may be “overridden by a two-thirds vote in each House.”122 The 
Court further clarified the difference between a permissible 
Presidential veto and unconstitutional repeal: 
There are important differences between the President’s 
“return” of a bill pursuant to Article I, § 7, and the 
                                                          
114 Id. at 957–58 (majority opinion). 
115 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
116 Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F. Supp. 2d 119, 129 (D.D.C. 
2007). 
117 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
118 Line Item Veto Act of 1996 § 204, 2 U.S.C.S. § 691 (2008), 
invalidated by Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
119 The Line Item Veto Act provided for presidential cancellation of any 
provision consisting of “(1) any dollar amount of discretionary budget 
authority; (2) any item of new direct spending; or (3) any limited tax 
benefit,” provided that the cancellation would “(i) reduce the Federal budget 
deficit; (ii) not impair any essential Government functions; and (iii) not harm 
he national interest” and that the President adhere to explicit guidelines in 
considering the cancellation. Id. 
120 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998) (citing 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983)). 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
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exercise of the President’s cancellation authority pursuant 
to the Line Item Veto Act. The constitutional return takes 
place before the bill becomes law; the statutory 
cancellation occurs after the bill becomes law. The 
constitutional return is of the entire bill; the statutory 
cancellation is of only a part. Although the Constitution 
expressly authorizes the President to play a role in the 
process of enacting statutes, it is silent on the subject of 
unilateral Presidential action that either repeals or amends 
parts of duly enacted statutes.123 
The Court interpreted this silence as “equivalent to an 
express prohibition.”124 Because the Framers went to such 
lengths to specify the procedures necessary for statutory 
enactment, the Court found that the omission of any language 
authorizing post-enactment repeal prohibits such action.125 Thus, 
the Court held that the end result of legislation affected by the 
Line Item Veto Act would not be “the product of the ‘finely 
wrought procedure’ the Framers designed.”126 Justice Kennedy 
clearly articulated the non-delegation principle, asserting that 
“[b]y increasing the power of the President beyond what the 
Framers envisioned, the statute compromises the political liberty 
of our citizens, liberty which the separation of powers seeks to 
secure.”127 Notably, Kennedy’s statement also describes Section 
102(c) of the Act, which has not been struck down and is still in 
force today.  
III. UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 102(C) OF THE REAL ID 
ACT 
A. Comparison to Clinton v. City of New York 
Similar to the Line Item Veto Act, Section 102(c) of the 
                                                          
123 Id. at 438–39. 
124 Id. at 439. 
125 See id. 
126 Id. at 440. 
127 Id. at 452 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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Real ID Act vests too much power in one individual. Moreover, 
because the power is vested in the secretary of an administrative 
agency, a politically appointed position, the statute represents an 
especially drastic deviation from the Framers’ vision.128 Further, 
the power granted to the President under the Line Item Veto Act 
was subject to more restrictions than that granted to the 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security under Section 
102(c) of the Real ID Act. While the Line Item Veto Act set 
forth specific requirements for the provisions subject to 
cancellation,129 it also provided for a built in check on the 
President’s cancellation power.130 By contrast, the Real ID Act 
provides no specific requirements for the waiver of laws; the 
Secretary is granted “authority to waive all legal requirements 
such Secretary, in such Secretary’s sole discretion, determines 
necessary to ensure expeditious construction of the barriers and 
roads.”131  
There is no built in check on the Secretary’s power. The 
Secretary’s waiver decision can only be examined through 
judicial review;132 therefore, unless a party with standing files 
suit, the decision will go unchecked. Significantly, even if a 
party with standing seeks judicial review, the narrow 
requirements for such a suit make it highly unlikely to 
                                                          
128 See supra note 79. 
129 See supra note 119. 
130 A cancellation takes effect upon receipt by Congress of the 
special message from the President. If, however, a “disapproval 
bill” pertaining to a special message is enacted into law, the 
cancellations set forth in that message become “null and void.” The 
Act sets forth a detailed expedited procedure for the consideration of 
a “disapproval bill” . . . . A majority vote of both Houses is 
sufficient to enact a disapproval bill. The Act does not grant the 
President the authority to cancel a disapproval bill, but he does, of 
course, retain constitutional authority to veto such a bill. 
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 436–37 (1998) (citing 2 
U.S.C.S. § 691). 
131 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global 
War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 102(c)(1), 119 
Stat. 231 (2005). 
132 See supra text accompanying note 23. 
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succeed.133 Though the separation of powers violations in the 
Real ID Act are more flagrant than those embodied in the Line 
Item Veto Act, the two statutes, nevertheless, bear remarkable 
similarities.  
The Court in Clinton explicitly stated that “[t]he cancellation 
of one section of a statute may be the functional equivalent of a 
partial repeal even if a portion of the section is not cancelled.”134 
In Clinton, a partial repeal was held unconstitutional under 
Article I, Section 7.135 A “partial repeal” is precisely what the 
Secretary of Homeland Security is authorized to do under the 
Real ID Act.136 By refusing to apply any and all statutes he 
deems necessary along the border, the Secretary is in effect 
partially repealing these statutes.137 While the district court held 
that this did not constitute a partial repeal because a waived law 
“retains the same legal force and effect as it had when it was 
passed by both houses of Congress and presented to the 
President,”138 this is clearly not the case. When statutes, 
particularly environmental ones, are enacted they are intended to 
protect specific places or things deemed especially valuable to 
society and to ensure the safety and health of citizens.139 How 
can it logically be argued that these statutes are not being 
partially repealed when they exempt over 700 miles of United 
States land,140 containing various endangered species141 and 
                                                          
133 See id. 
134 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 441 (1998). 
135 Id. at 444. 
136 Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Renewed Motion to Dismiss, 
Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 
07-1801); Plaintiff’s Lodged Surreply to Defendants’ Renewed Motion to 
Dismiss, Defenders of Wildlife, 527 F. Supp. 2d 119 (No. 07-1801).  
137 Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Renewed Motion, supra note 
136; Plaintiff’s Lodged Surreply, supra note 136. 
138 Defenders of Wildlife, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 124. 
139 See supra note 36. 
140 8 U.S.C.A. § 1103 note (b)(1)(A) (West 2009) (Improvement of 
Barriers at Border). 
141 Defenders of Wildlife, Border Fence Construction: San Pedro 
Riparian NCA, http://www.defenders.org/programs_and_policy/in_the_ 
courts/legal_docket/border_fence_construction_san_pedro_riparian_nca.php 
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specifically designated as a conservation area?142 When statutes 
are not applied to several of the items they were designed to 
protect, they are being partially repealed. 
While the district court stated that labeling the Secretary’s 
actions under the Real ID Act a partial repeal would invalidate 
“numerous other statutory authorizations of executive 
waivers,”143 this reasoning is flawed.  The statutory waiver 
authorizations cited by the district court in support of this 
proposition were far more specific and detailed than the 
sweeping authorization in Section 102(c) of the Real ID Act.144 
Further, the Line Item Veto Act “require[d] the President to 
adhere to precise procedures whenever he exercises his 
cancellation authority. In identifying items for cancellation he 
must consider the legislative history, the purposes, and other 
relevant information about the items,”145 while the Real ID Act 
requires no such consideration and is entirely discretionary on 
                                                          
(last visited Sept. 30, 2009). 
142 See supra note 29. 
143 Defenders of Wildlife, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 125. 
144 The court cited:  
10 U.S.C. § 433 (Secretary of Defense, “in connection with a 
commercial activity,” may waive compliance with “certain Federal 
laws or regulations pertaining to the management and administration 
of Federal agencies” if they would “create an unacceptable risk of 
compromise of an authorized intelligence activity”); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 2621 (EPA may waive compliance with Toxic Substances Act 
“upon a request and determination by the President that the 
requested waiver is necessary in the interest of national defense.”); 
20 U.S.C. § 7426(e) (Secretaries of the Interior, Labor, Health and 
Human Services, and Education “[n]otwithstanding any other 
provision of law. . . shall have the authority to waive any regulation, 
policy, or procedure promulgated by [their] department” necessary 
for the integration of education and related services provided to 
Indian students); 22 U.S.C. § 7207(a)(3) (President may waive a 
statutory prohibition on assistance to certain countries “to the degree 
[he] determines that it is in the national security interest of the 
United States to do so, or for humanitarian reasons”).  
Id. at 125 n.5.   
145 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 436 (1998). 
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the part of the Secretary.146 This raises the obvious question of 
why there is such incongruence between the Supreme Court’s 
management of the two Acts. After declaring the Line Item Veto 
Act unconstitutional, the Court declined to test the 
constitutionality of the Real ID Act,147 thereby permitting a 
violation of the separation of powers. 
B. Comparison to INS v. Chadha 
Similar inconsistency can be seen when comparing the 
Court’s inaction in Defenders of Wildlife to its holding in 
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha.148 The 
legislative veto at issue in Chadha was, as the Court conceded, a 
“convenient shortcut.”149 However, while acknowledging that a 
one House veto was “on its face, an appealing compromise,” the 
Court stated that “it is crystal clear from the records of the 
Convention, contemporaneous writings and debates, that the 
Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency.”150 Allowing 
the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to waive 
“all legal requirements . . . [he] determines necessary to ensure 
expeditious construction”151 of border fences and roads clearly 
has the appeal of swift action.  During the period of increasing 
xenophobia following September 11th, the rapid completion of 
border reinforcements became desirable to many government 
officials and American citizens alike.152 However, as the Court 
                                                          
146 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global 
War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109–13, § 102(c)(1), 119 
Stat. 231 (2005). 
147 Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 128 S. Ct. 2962 (2008). 
148 Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) 
(holding one-House veto provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
unconstitutional). 
149 Id. at 958. 
150 Id. at 958–59. 
151 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act § 102(c)(1). 
152 See Jeffrey M. Jones, Nearly Half of Americans Say Immigration 
Levels Should Be Decreased, GALLUP, July 10, 2003, http://www.gallup. 
com/poll/8815/Nearly-Half-Americans-Say-Immigration-Levels-Should-
Decreased.aspx.  
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noted in Chadha, “[t]he choices we discern as having been made 
in the Constitutional Convention impose burdens on 
governmental processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even 
unworkable, but those hard choices were consciously made by 
men who had lived under a form of government that permitted 
arbitrary governmental acts to go unchecked.”153 Of course it is a 
convenient shortcut to waive any and all statutes that would 
interfere with border reinforcements, most of which are 
environmental and would require surveys and the possible 
alteration of construction plans. However, the separation of 
powers doctrine forbids such an unrestrained grant of power to 
one individual and, as the Court stated in Chadha, “[t]here is no 
support in the Constitution or decisions of this Court for the 
proposition that the cumbersomeness and delays often 
encountered in complying with explicit constitutional standards 
may be avoided, either by Congress or by the President.”154 
Simply put, no branch of government may discount the carefully 
constructed constitutional system of separation of powers and 
checks and balances in the interest of efficiency. 
This tension between expediency and constitutionality is not 
the only parallel between Section 244(c)(1) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act and Section 102(c) of the Real ID Act.155 
Both acts deal with the power to nullify constitutionally valid 
decisions or statutes.156 Clearly, the doctrine of checks and 
balances places great emphasis on the value of internal 
government regulation.157 However, this process was carefully 
laid out in the Constitution and the power to nullify proposed 
legislation was delegated to the President.158 This delegation of 
power “was based on the profound conviction of the Framers 
that the powers conferred on Congress were the powers to be 
                                                          
153 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959. 
154 Id. (referencing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579 (1952)). 
155 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act § 102(c)(2). 
156 See supra text accompanying notes 19, 109. 
157 See supra note 79. 
158 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
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most carefully circumscribed.”159 Because no such veto power 
was conferred elsewhere, the Court in Chadha held that the 
ability of one House of Congress to void a constitutionally valid 
decision of the Executive Branch was unconstitutional.160 
Similarly, the ability of one Executive Branch administrative 
agency officer to waive any and all statutes he deems necessary 
far exceeds the Framers’ precisely carved out veto provision.161 
The current system is far from perfect, but as the Court aptly 
stated in Chadha, “[w]ith all the obvious flaws of delay, 
untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not yet found a 
better way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise of 
power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the 
Constitution.”162  
It is when these explicit constitutional procedures begin to 
erode in the name of convenience that the entire system of 
government is in danger. While there exists a natural push and 
pull between the three branches, it is expected that when 
legislation extends beyond constitutional boundaries, the Court 
will step in and perform its function as a legislative check.163 
These decisions will not always be straightforward. As the Court 
stated in Chadha, “[q]uestions may occur which we would 
gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to 
exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our 
duty.”164 However, instead of performing its constitutionally 
appointed duty, the Court chose to avoid the issue in Defenders 
of Wildlife. Section 102(c) of the Real ID Act should have been 
evaluated by the Court and declared unconstitutional for 
violating the separation of powers doctrine, specifically its 
nondelegation doctrine. 
 
                                                          
159 Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 947 
(1983). 
160 Id. at 959. 
161 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
162 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959. 
163 See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.   
164 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944. 
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C. The Intelligible Principle Requirement of the 
Nondelegation Doctrine 
Recognizing that, in an ever-changing, complicated society, 
circumstances would necessarily arise in which congressional 
delegation of authority was warranted, the Supreme Court set 
forth strict guidelines for such delegation in J.W. Hampton Jr., 
& Co. v. United States.165 Under the nondelegation doctrine, 
Congress may enact legislation delegating some of its 
rulemaking authority to administrative agencies as long as the 
legislation sets forth an “intelligible principle” to which the 
agency must adhere.166 Because Congress had provided explicit 
guidelines in the Tariff Act of 1922,167 its delegation of tariff 
adjustment duties to the President was held constitutional in 
Hampton.168 Specifically, the President was only permitted to 
adjust tariffs when certain requirements were met.169 Congress 
also provided a detailed list of factors for the President to 
consider in making his determination.170 Investigations were 
                                                          
165 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928). 
166 Id. at 409. 
167 Tariff Act of Sept. 21, 1922, ch. 356, § 315, 42 Stat. 941–943 
(repealed 1930). 
168 J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. 394. 
169 When the difference between the domestic production cost of a 
product and the production cost of the product in a competing foreign country 
was not equalized by the current tariff, the President was authorized to adjust 
the tariff in order to achieve equalization. Id. at 401. 
170 (c). That in ascertaining the differences in costs of production, 
under the provisions of subdivisions (a) and (b) of this section, the 
President, in so far as he finds it practicable, shall take into 
consideration (1) the differences in conditions in production, 
including wages, costs of material, and other items in costs of 
production of such or similar articles in the United States and in 
competing foreign countries; (2) the differences in the wholesale 
selling prices of domestic and foreign articles in the principal 
markets of the United States; (3) advantages granted to a foreign 
producer by a foreign government, or by a person, partnership, 
corporation, or association in a foreign country; and (4) any other 
advantages or disadvantages in competition.  
Id. at 401–02 (quoting Tariff Act Sept. 21, 1922, ch. 356, § 315, 42 Stat. 
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required prior to the tariff adjustments, including public 
hearings.171 Further, Congress included restrictions prohibiting 
the “transfer of an article from the dutiable list to the free list or 
from the free list to the dutiable list, [or] a change in form of 
duty” and specified that the adjustments were subject to reversal 
when the requirements were no longer met.172 Thus, Congress 
delegated its power under detailed criteria in the Tariff Act and 
the Court utilized these standards when setting forth the 
“intelligible principle” doctrine.173   
The Court further defined the “intelligible principle” concept 
in the more recent case, Mistretta v. United States, where it 
stated that in order for a delegation to be constitutionally valid, 
Congress must “clearly delineat[e] the general policy, the public 
agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated 
authority.”174 The Court again found a constitutional delegation 
because in delegating authority to the United States Sentencing 
Commission to promulgate sentencing guidelines under the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,175 Congress set forth numerous 
parameters. Using a formula similar to the Tariff Act, Congress 
articulated precise requirements for the formation of the 
sentencing guidelines,176 provided factors to be considered by the 
                                                          
941–943 (repealed 1930)). 
171 Investigations to assist the President in ascertaining differences in 
costs of production under this section shall be made by the United 
States Tariff Commission, and no proclamation shall be issued under 
this section until such investigation shall have been made. The 
commission shall give reasonable public notice of its hearings and 
shall give reasonable opportunity to parties interested to be present, 
to produce evidence, and to be heard.  
Id. at 402. 
172 Id. 
173 See id. at 409. 
174 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372–73 (1989) (quoting 
Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946)). 
175 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq., 28 U.S.C. 
§ 991–98 (2008). 
176 Congress instructed the Commission that these sentencing ranges 
must be consistent with pertinent provisions of Title 18 of the United 
States Code and could not include sentences in excess of the 
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Commission,177 and set forth specific restrictions.178 Additionally, 
the Commission was given a list of what the newly formed 
guidelines were required to include.179 Because, “in addition to 
                                                          
statutory maxima. Congress also required that for sentences of 
imprisonment, “the maximum of the range established for such a 
term shall not exceed the minimum of that range by more than the 
greater of 25 percent or 6 months, except that, if the minimum term 
of the range is 30 years or more, the maximum may be life 
imprisonment.” Moreover, Congress directed the Commission to use 
current average sentences “as a starting point” for its structuring of 
the sentencing ranges.  
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 374–75 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994). 
177 To guide the Commission in its formulation of offense categories, 
Congress directed it to consider seven factors: the grade of the 
offense; the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the crime; 
the nature and degree of the harm caused by the crime; the 
community view of the gravity of the offense; the public concern 
generated by the crime; the deterrent effect that a particular sentence 
may have on others; and the current incidence of the offense. 
Congress set forth 11 factors for the Commission to consider in 
establishing categories of defendants. These include the offender’s 
age, education, vocational skills, mental and emotional condition, 
physical condition (including drug dependence), previous 
employment record, family ties and responsibilities, community ties, 
role in the offense, criminal history, and degree of dependence upon 
crime for a livelihood.  
Id. at 375–76 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994). 
178 “Congress also prohibited the Commission from considering the ‘race, 
sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders,’ and 
instructed that the guidelines should reflect the ‘general inappropriateness’ of 
considering certain other factors, such as current unemployment, that might 
serve as proxies for forbidden factors.” Id. at 376 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994). 
179 Congress mandated that the guidelines include: “(A) a 
determination whether to impose a sentence to probation, a fine, or a 
term of imprisonment; (B) a determination as to the appropriate 
amount of a fine or the appropriate length of a term of probation or 
a term of imprisonment; (C) a determination whether a sentence to a 
term of imprisonment should include a requirement that the 
defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after 
imprisonment, and, if so, the appropriate length of such a term; and 
(D) a determination whether multiple sentences to terms of 
imprisonment should be ordered to run concurrently or 
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these overarching constraints, Congress provided even more 
detailed guidance to the Commission,”180 the Court found that 
the intelligible principal standard had actually been exceeded and 
“in actuality [Congress] legislated a full hierarchy of 
punishment.”181 Nonetheless, the “intelligible principle” doctrine 
was reaffirmed and further elucidated by the Court.182 It is clear 
from both Hampton and Mistretta that in order to be 
constitutional, a congressional delegation must set forth more 
than a general directive.183 Rather, it must include definite 
standards to guide the agency in its decision-making.184 
The absolute lack of standards in Section 102(c) of the Real 
ID Act is a glaring violation of the nondelegation doctrine. In 
fact, it is difficult to compare the Act to Hampton and Mistretta 
because there are virtually no guidelines in Section 102(c) on 
which to base a comparison.185 Both the Tariff Act and the 
Sentencing Reform Act began with specific requirements that 
had to be met in order for the designated authority to act.186 The 
only requirement in Section 102(c) is the wholly discretionary 
opinion of the Secretary that the action is “necessary to ensure 
expeditious construction of the barriers and roads.”187 This is 
hardly the same kind of standard upheld in Hampton and 
Mistretta. While the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act sets forth several factors to be considered in 
erecting the border fences,188 the Secretary is not directed to 
                                                          
consecutively.” 
Id. at 374 n.8 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1)). 
180 Id. at 376. 
181 Id. at 377. 
182 Id. at 372–77. 
183 See id.; J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 
(1928). 
184 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361; J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. 394. 
185 See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the 
Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109–13, 
§ 102(c)(1), 119 Stat. 231 (2005). 
186 See supra text accompanying notes 145, 154. 
187 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act § 102(c)(1). 
188 In general. In carrying out this section, the Secretary of 
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consider any factors in making his determination of statutory 
waivers.189 Thus, while the Secretary may choose to consider the 
aforementioned factors, the language of the Real ID Act does 
not require him to.190 Rather, the only guiding principle is his 
“sole discretion.”191 He is simply authorized to “waive all legal 
requirements.”192 This absence of any meaningful restriction on 
the Secretary’s authority is an unprecedented deviation from the 
“intelligible principle” standard.  
The district court’s finding that the specifications of areas of 
“high illegal entry,” deterring “illegal crossings,” and 
“necessary to ensure expeditious construction” constitute 
sufficient guiding principles is not convincing.193 Imagine a 
similar directive in Mistretta.  Surely the Court would not have 
upheld a delegation to the Sentencing Commission to promulgate 
sentencing guidelines that the Commission, in its sole discretion, 
deemed necessary to punish criminals. Likewise, the Tariff Act 
delegation in Hampton would not have passed constitutional 
muster had it delegated power to the President to adjust any 
tariffs he deemed necessary in the interest of equality between 
domestic and foreign production or, even more akin to 
Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, allowed the President to waive 
such tariffs. The holding in Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff is 
clearly at odds with both landmark nondelegation cases. 
At the same time, Section 102(c) of the Real ID Act bears a 
striking resemblance to legislation the Court has previously 
                                                          
Homeland Security shall consult with the Secretary of the Interior, 
the Secretary of Agriculture, States, local governments, Indian 
tribes, and property owners in the United States to minimize the 
impact on the environment, culture, commerce, and quality of life 
for the communities and residents located near the sites at which 
such fencing is to be constructed. 
8 U.S.C.A. § 1103 note (b)(1)(C)(i) (West 2009) (Improvement of Barriers at 
Border). 
189 See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act § 102(c)(1). 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text. 
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struck down on nondelegation grounds.194 In Panama Refining 
Co. v. Ryan, the Court found the congressional delegation under 
Section 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933195 
“without constitutional authority.”196 In an effort to regulate the 
national oil industry, Section 9(c) delegated power to the 
President to enforce limits on oil transportation.197 However, 
similar to Section 102(c) of the Real ID Act, this delegation 
lacked a sufficient intelligible principle.198 The Court noted, 
“Section 9(c) does not state whether, or in what circumstances 
or under what conditions, the President is to [act under the given 
authority] . . . . It establishes no criterion to govern the 
President’s course . . . [and] does not require any finding by the 
President as a condition of his action.”199 Likewise, Section 
102(c) of the Real ID Act provides no guide for when the 
Secretary may or may not exercise his statutory waiver 
authority. The district court found that the phrase “areas of high 
illegal entry,” in reference to fencing sites, constituted a 
                                                          
194 See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
195 National Industry Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73–67, § 9(c), 48 Stat. 
195, 200 (1933), invalidated by A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
196 Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 433.  
197 (c) The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in 
interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products 
thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount 
permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any state 
law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any 
board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a 
State. Any violation of any order of the President issued under the 
provisions of this subsection shall be punishable by fine of not to 
exceed $ 1,000, or imprisonment for not to exceed six months, or 
both.  
National Industry Recovery Act § 9(c). 
198 “As to the transportation of oil production in excess of state 
permission, the Congress has declared no policy, has established no standard, 
has laid down no rule. There is no requirement, no definition of 
circumstances and conditions in which the transportation is to be allowed or 
prohibited.” Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 430. 
199 Id. at 415. 
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sufficient guideline.200 However, there is no definition for this 
term anywhere within the Real ID Act.201 It is mentioned but 
once in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act, without providing even general criteria.202 
The other guideline, what the Secretary deems “necessary,”203 is 
even more subjective, open to almost limitless interpretation. 
The Court’s characterization of Section 9(c) in Panama Refining 
Co. is an all too apt description of Section 102(c) of the Real ID 
Act.204 Section 9(c) actually provided more direction by 
furnishing distinct rules for the President to follow,205 whereas 
the Real ID Act relegates decision-making to the Secretary’s sole 
discretion. Nonetheless, the Court in Panama Refining Co. held 
the delegation unconstitutional because it provided “the President 
an unlimited authority to determine the policy and to lay down 
the prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may see fit.”206 This 
is precisely the type of authority Section 102(c) of the Real ID 
Act grants to the Secretary of Homeland Security. 
Panama Refining Co. is not the only example of the Court’s 
incongruous treatment of Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff.207 In 
A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, the Court 
                                                          
200 Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F. Supp. 2d 119, 128 (D.D.C. 
2007). 
201 See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the 
Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 
231 (2005). 
202 8 U.S.C.A. § 1103 note (a) (West 2009) (Improvement of Barriers at 
Border). 
203 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act § 102(c)(1). 
204 Id.; see also supra notes 198–99 and accompanying text.  
205 The President was required to use state laws, regulations, or orders as 
the benchmark for permitted transportation quantities. National Industry 
Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, § 9(c), 48 Stat. 195, 200 (1933), 
invalidated by A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 
495 (1935). 
206 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 415 (1934). 
207 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1988); A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); J.W. 
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928). 
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struck down another unconstitutional congressional delegation.208 
The legislation at issue in Schechter, Section 3 of the National 
Industrial Recovery Act,209 again bore a strong resemblance to 
Section 102(c) of the Real ID Act. Under Section 3, the 
President was granted authority to approve industry codes of 
“fair competition.”210 “Fair competition” was not defined in the 
National Industrial Recovery Act,211 just as “high illegal entry” 
and “necessary” are not defined in the Real ID Act.212 Due to 
                                                          
208 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. 495. 
209 National Industry Recovery Act § 3. 
210 Id.  
(a) Upon the application to the President by one or more trade or 
industrial associations or groups, the President may approve a code 
or codes of fair competition for the trade or industry or subdivision 
thereof, represented by the applicant or applicants, if the President 
finds (1) that such associations or groups impose no inequitable 
restrictions on admission to membership therein and are truly 
representative of such trades or industries or subdivisions thereof, 
and (2) that such code or codes are not designed to promote 
monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not 
operate to discriminate against them, and will tend to effectuate the 
policy of this title: Provided, That such code or codes shall not 
permit monopolies or monopolistic practices: Provided further, That 
where such code or codes affect the services and welfare of persons 
engaged in other steps of the economic process, nothing in this 
section shall deprive such persons of the right to be heard prior to 
approval by the President of such code or codes. The President may, 
as a condition of his approval of any such code, impose such 
conditions (including requirements for the making of reports and the 
keeping of accounts) for the protection of consumers, competitors, 
employees, and others, and in furtherance of the public interest, and 
may provide such exceptions to and exemptions from the provisions 
of such code, as the President in his discretion deems necessary to 
effectuate the policy herein declared.  
Id. § 3(a). 
211 The Court struggled to find a definition, referencing sources such as 
the common law and the Federal Trade Commission Act. A.L.A. Schechter 
Poultry, 295 U.S. at 531–35. 
212 See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the 
Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 
231 (2005). 
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the ambiguous language, the Court in Schechter found that 
Section 3 supplied “no standards for any trade, industry or 
activity.”213 Further, the Court held that it lacked sufficient 
guidelines “aside from the statement of the general aims of 
rehabilitation, correction and expansion described in section 
one.”214 A “statement of general aims” is precisely what 
Congress set forth in Section 102(c) of the Real ID Act. The 
Secretary is directed to use his discretion in furtherance of the 
broad goals of “deter[ing] illegal crossings”215 and “ensur[ing] 
expeditious construction” of barriers.216 It was exactly this sort 
of directive in Schechter that led the Court to hold, “[i]n view of 
the scope of that broad declaration, and of the nature of the few 
restrictions that are imposed, the discretion of the 
President . . . is virtually unfettered” and, therefore, “an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.”217 This begs the 
obvious question of why the Court did not come to the same 
conclusion in Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff. The Secretary’s 
limitless statutory waiver authority is a clear violation of the 
nondelegation doctrine. Given the Court’s intelligible principle 
jurisprudence, it is clear that the congressional delegation in 
Section 102(c) of the Real ID Act is unconstitutional.   
IV. DETRIMENTAL RESULTS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S INACTION 
A. Environmental Effects 
The Secretary’s vast power is only exacerbated by the 
drastically limited options for review provided by the Real ID 
Act.218 Given the narrow restrictions placed on judicial 
                                                          
213 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 541. 
214 Id. 
215 8 U.S.C.A. § 1103 note (a) (West 2009) (Improvement of Barriers at 
Border). 
216 Id. § 1103 note (c)(1). 
217 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 541–42. 
218 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global 
War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 102(c)(2), 119 
Stat. 231 (2005). 
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intervention,219 the Court’s denial of certiorari was especially 
troublesome. Unfortunately, the Court’s inaction will likely have 
a lasting effect on the environment. Defenders of Wildlife 
warned that construction of the border fence in the SPRNCA 
would “fragment[] critical corridors for wildlife, including 
jaguars, black bear . . . and many other species.”220 This 
presents an especially dire situation for the endangered jaguars 
whose long-term survival is dependent upon their ability to roam 
over a large area.221 In addition, the fence would block 
“numerous desert washes feeding the San Pedro River and 
floodplain, resulting in erosion and sedimentation into the river, 
which provides habitat for hundreds of breeding, migratory, and 
wintering bird species, as well as more than 80 species of 
mammals.”222  
Further, the Bureau of Land Management, whose initial 
Environmental Assessment (EA) found “no significant 
environmental impact,”223 subsequently issued a supplemental 
memorandum following a visit to the fence site.224 The memo 
expressed serious concerns about floods resulting from debris 
build-up on the fence.225 It continued, “[t]he timing and intensity 
of seasonal flood flows in the San Pedro River are essential for 
maintaining riparian function as well as recharging the alluvial 
aquifer. Regardless of the maintenance commitments by Border 
Patrol, the proposed/existing fence could inadvertently act as a 
flood control structure altering natural flood characteristics.”226 
                                                          
219 See supra text accompanying note 19. 
220 Border Fence Construction, supra note 141. 
221 Joe Zentner, Jaguars on the Fence, DESERT USA, http://www.desert 
usa.com/mag06/dec/jaguars.html. 
222 Border Fence Construction, supra note 141. 
223 Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F. Supp. 2d 119, 121 (D.D.C. 
2007). 
224 Memorandum from the Bureau of Land Management, BLM EA #AZ-
420-2007-051 Supplement (Oct. 4, 2007), available at http://www.biological 
diversity.org/programs/public_lands/rivers/san_pedro_river/pdfs/blm-foia-
resp-040808-BLM-concerns-100407.pdf.  
225 Id. 
226 Id.  
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Notably, the supplemental memo was issued several weeks prior 
to Chertoff’s waiver.227 Chertoff only cited to the initial EA’s 
finding of “no significant environmental impact” in support of 
his waiver decision.228  
Unfortunately, the memo proved to be an accurate predictor. 
In July of 2008, the combination of heavy rains and border 
fencing in southwestern Arizona resulted in severe flooding at 
the Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument.229 According to 
news reports, the flooding was caused by “debris and water 
backup [at the fence] during a . . . storm.”230 Just as many fence 
opponents feared,  
[r]apidly moving runoff in washes dislodged or eroded 
large chunks of concrete foundations, and debris stacking 
up against the fence itself created barriers or dams 
redirecting the water, creating gullies and causing even 
more erosion . . . . It created backwater pools up to 
seven feet deep and lateral flows several hundred feet 
wide that moved out of the washes, eroding some areas 
along patrol roads. The waters even scoured some fence 
and vehicle barrier foundations.231  
Despite these seemingly prophetic events, fence construction 
at the SPRNCA continued. Unlike Organ Pipe Cactus National 
Monument, the plans for SPRNCA include movable barriers in 
the riverbed that may be removed to minimize affecting water 
                                                          
227 Determination Pursuant to Section 102 of the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 as Amended by Section 
102 of the REAL ID Act of 2005 and as Amended by the Secure Fence Act 
of 206, 72 Fed. Reg. 60,870 (Oct. 26, 2007). 
228 Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Department of Homeland 
Security: Statement Regarding Exercise of Waiver Authority (Oct. 2007), 
available at http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/public_lands/rivers/ 
san_pedro_river/pdfs/dhs-EXEMPTION-statement-200710.pdf.   
229 The flooding occurred at the port of entry at Lukeville, Arizona and 
Sonoyta Sonora, Mexico. Arthur H. Rotstein, Border Fence Causing 
Flooding Trouble, TUCSON CITIZEN, Aug. 24, 2008, http://www.tucson 
citizen.com/ss/local/94705.php.  
230 Id. 
231 Id. 
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flow.232 However, recognizing the irony of placing removable 
barriers in an area known for flash floods, one critic stated, 
“[i]t’s a joke . . . [l]ike they’re going to anticipate when it’s 
going to flood and they’re going to go out and remove them.”233 
Thus, the SPRNCA remains vulnerable to destruction similar to 
that experienced at Organ Pipe.234   
B. Political Consequences  
While the environmental effects of the Court’s inaction are 
potentially devastating, so are the political ramifications if the 
Court stays this course. The “separation of powers framework 
was designed to prevent special interests from co-opting the 
government . . . . [T]hese special interests must convince three 
different groups with three different constituencies of the 
correctness of their proposals.”235 Consequently, the erosion of 
the separation of powers doctrine by Section 102(c) of the Real 
ID Act provides special interest groups with the ability to wield 
extensive influence simply by swaying the judgment of one 
individual. In Chadha, the Court recognized the danger in such 
a situation, noting that the purpose of congressional power to 
override a presidential veto is to “preclud[e] final arbitrary 
action of one person.”236 However, final arbitrary action is 
precisely what Chertoff exercised in his waiver of the twenty 
statutes.237  
While the direct effects of Section 102(c) are disconcerting, 
                                                          
232 Howard Fischer, BLM: Border Barriers Would Harm San Pedro Area, 
EAST VALLEY TRIBUNE, Apr. 27, 2008, http://www.eastvalleytribune. 
com/story/114902. 
233 Id. (quoting Sandy Bahr, Sierra Club).  
234 See supra text accompanying notes 226, 231. 
235 Michael G. Locklar, Is the 1996 Line-Item Veto Constitutional?, 34 
HOUS. L. REV. 1161, 1179 (1997). 
236 Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 
(1983). 
237 See Determination Pursuant to Section 102 of the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 as Amended by Section 
102 of the REAL ID Act of 2005 and as Amended by the Secure Fence Act 
of 206, 72 Fed. Reg. 60,870 (Oct. 26, 2007). 
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an even larger potential problem exists if the Court stays the 
course of inaction while similar unconstitutional legislation is 
enacted. The danger in violating the separation of powers 
doctrine and, thus, allowing special interest groups increased 
power over legislation is embodied in the very title of these 
groups. Special interests strive to further the goals of specific 
sects of society, as opposed to the general public.238 Because 
these groups vary in size and funding, the more powerful groups 
tend to be those with the most funding.239 A system that 
facilitates the interests of the affluent while ignoring those with 
less means drastically deviates from the Framers’ vision of equal 
representation and protection from “improvident laws.”240  
However, well-funded special interests are not the only 
danger associated with the deterioration of the separation of 
powers doctrine. Political parties also represent different sects of 
society, at times greatly at odds with one another. Upon its first 
introduction, the Real ID Act was passed in the House of 
Representatives with ninety-six percent of Republicans voting for 
it and seventy-eight percent of Democrats voting against it.241 
                                                          
238 Some well known special interest groups include the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), Anti-
Defamation League, and Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders 
(GLAD). Political Advocacy Groups, A Directory of United States 
Lobbyists, http://www.vancouver.wsu.edu/fac/kfountain/alpha.html (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2009). 
239 A Fortune Magazine survey confirmed “the more money a group 
spent on its plain old lobbying efforts in Washington, the more influence it 
wielded.” Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Follow the Money. Hard Money. Soft 
Money. Lobbying Money. Which Buys the Most Influence in Washington? 
FORTUNE’s Power 25 Survey Attempts an Answer and Ranks the Top 
Lobbying Groups, FORTUNE, Dec. 6, 1999. According to Fortune’s Power 25 
survey, the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) was the most 
powerful lobbying group, while the National Rifle Association was tied for 
second place. Id. 
240 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951. 
241 Brian Murphy, The Real ID Act of 2005: Tightening the Burden on 
Asylum Seekers, Federal Standards for Driver’s Licenses, and Patching a 
Hole in a Border Fence at the Cost of Other Legislation, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 191, 191 (2004) (citations omitted). The bill was not passed due to 
opposition in the Senate.  See supra note 2 and accompanying text.  
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This disparity illustrates the profound divide between the two 
political parties. It also serves as a warning against granting 
sweeping authority to one individual. Despite the expected 
uneven distribution of representatives in Congress, the presence 
of both parties encourages dialogue and debate regarding 
important legislative matters. In stark contrast, the delegation of 
broad authority to one individual requires no debate. Legislation, 
such as Section 102(c) of the Real ID Act, leaves important 
legislative matters to the discretion of one individual and, 
consequently, the unfettered will of one political party. 
Ironically, the Court’s negligence in addressing this violation of 
separation of powers means that the solution will likely come 
from exertion of political party power. 
V. A CONGRESSIONAL SOLUTION TO THE COURT’S FAILURE AS A 
LEGISLATIVE CHECK 
Fortunately, some legislators are aware of the 
unconstitutionality of Section 102(c).242 As illustrated by the 
original House vote in 2005, the majority of those legislators are 
Democrats.243 In fact, in June of 2007 U.S. Rep. Raul Grijalva, 
D-Ariz., introduced legislation that would have repealed the 
Secretary’s waiver authority granted under the Real ID Act.244 
The Borderlands Conservation and Security Act245 not only 
provided for the outright repeal of Section 102(c) of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
but also required the Secretary to:  
develop a border protection strategy that supports the 
border security needs of the United States in a manner 
that best protects—(A) units of the National Park System; 
(B) National Forest System land; (C) land under the 
                                                          
242 Forty-eight U.S. Representatives, all of whom were Democrats, co-
sponsored the Borderlands Conservation and Security Act that, if passed, 
would have repealed Section 102(c) of the Real ID Act. Borderlands 
Conservation and Security Act of 2007, H.R. 2593, 110th Cong. (2007). 
243 See supra text accompanying note 241. 
244 H.R. 2593. 
245 Id. 
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jurisdiction of the Bureau of Land Management; (D) land 
under the jurisdiction of the United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service; and (E) other relevant land under the 
jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior or the 
Department of Agriculture.246  
U.S. Rep. Earl Blumenauer, a fellow Democrat, expressed 
support for the bill, stating “[i]t is unprecedented that a single 
person can be above the law without any judicial appeal or 
remedy . . . . And it is absurd to claim that he must waive the 
Safe Drinking Water Act and Clean Air Act, to name a few, in 
order to build this border fence.”247 Unfortunately, the bill 
stalled in committee shortly after its introduction.248 As a result it 
was “cleared from the books” upon termination of the 110th 
congressional session.249 There is still hope that the Democratic 
victory in the recent election250 may revive the bill or lead to 
similar legislation.251 This corrective legislative action is 
necessary due to the Court’s failure to perform its duty as a 
legislative check. While such congressional action would correct 
                                                          
246 Id. § 4(a)(1). The Secretary is directed to develop the protection plan 
in cooperation with the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of 
Agriculture. Id.   
247 David McLemore, Fight Over Border Fence Environmental Waivers 
Could Reach Supreme Court, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 15, 2008, 
(quoting U.S. Rep. Earl Blumenauer, D-Ore.).  
248 The Bill was referred to the Committee on Homeland Security, 
Committee on Natural Resources, and Committee on Agriculture on June 6, 
2007. H.R. 2593. 
249 GovTrack, H.R. 2593: Borderlands Conservation and Security Act of 
2007, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-2593 (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2009). 
250 The Democratic Party won majority control of both Houses of 
Congress in 2008. House of Representatives Big Board Election Results 2008, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2008, http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/results/house/ 
votes.html; Senate Big Board Election Results 2008, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 
2008, http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/results/senate/votes.html.   
251 Legislation has already been introduced in the House and Senate that 
would repeal Title II of the Real Id Act, the section requiring national ID 
cards. REAL ID Repeal and Identification Security Enhancement Act of 
2009, H.R. 3471, 111th Cong. (2009); Providing for Additional Security in 
States’ Identification Act of 2009, S. 1261, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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the separation of powers violation, it is likely too late to mitigate 
the damage to border lands and wildlife. The 670 miles of 
border fence originally slated for December 31, 2008 
completion252 are now nearly finished.253 Additionally, Rep. 
Grijalva admits that the poor state of the economy254 means the 
Act is no longer a congressional priority.255 Unfortunately, 
Section 102(c) of the Real ID Act may now be relegated to 
serving as a warning beacon for future legislators. 
If Congress recognizes its prior error, it may be more 
cautious before enacting future legislation that threatens the 
separation of powers doctrine. As Professor Jonathan Turley, a 
constitutional law scholar at George Washington University 
explained, “there is no evidence Congress considered the 
implications of giving Homeland Security such broad waiver 
power.”256 As Congress now realizes the consequences of 
granting such sweeping authority, it may be more diligent in 
analyzing the effects of future delegations. The full 
environmental cost of this lesson remains to be seen, but its 
                                                          
252 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
253 See Department of Homeland Security, Southwest Border Fence 
Construction Status Map, http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/ 
highlights/fence_map.ctt/fence_map.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2009). 
254 See Edmund L. Andrews, Fed Chief Defends Steps Taken to Contain 
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2009. 
255 “There’s a shift in priorities now with the economy . . . . Throwing 
$450 million at a fence pales in comparison to fixing our economy.” Melissa 
Del Bosque, Back to the Wall, TEXAS OBSERVER, Feb. 6, 2009 (quoting U.S. 
Rep. Raul Grijalva).  
256 McLemore, supra note 247 (quoting Prof. Jonathan Turley, George 
Washington University). Professor Turley: 
is a nationally recognized legal scholar who has written extensively 
in areas ranging from constitutional law to legal theory to tort law . . 
. . He has served as a consultant on homeland security and 
constitutional issues, and is a frequent witness before the House and 
Senate on constitutional and statutory issues as well as tort reform 
legislation. 
George Washington University Law School, Jonathan Turley, http://www. 
law.gwu.edu/Faculty/profile.aspx?id=1738 (last visited Sept. 30, 2009).  
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significance should not be underestimated.257 As one Defender’s 
of Wildlife representative stated, “[w]hen you disregard 
environmental laws, it leads to real adverse impacts . . . . It’s 
not just an academic argument.”258  
 
                                                          
257 See supra text accompanying notes 226, 231. 
258 Del Bosque, supra note 255 (quoting Defenders of Wildlife federal 
lands associate Noah Kahn).  
